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Abstract 
The positivity-familiarity effect suggests that people use positive affect as a cue to answer the 
question of whether they have encountered a stimulus before. Five experiments investigated this 
effect under various conditions. Positivity-familiarity effects were obtained irrespective of 
whether the task context suggested a correct answer to the question of whether a given target 
stimulus is familiar or unfamiliar. However, effects were less reliable when participants had a 
basis to assume that they had been presented with the target stimuli earlier in the same study and 
when they were asked to indicate whether the targets had been presented before (instead of 
judging them as familiar or unfamiliar). Positivity-familiarity effects were also obtained 
irrespective of whether affective primes were presented for short, moderate, or long durations. 
However, effects were less reliable for short compared to moderate and long prime presentations. 
Implications for the positivity-familiarity effect and other misattribution phenomena are 
discussed. 
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When people make judgments under uncertainty, they often rely on cues. For example, 
when trying to answer the question of whether we like a certain object, we might rely on the 
positive feelings associated with the fluency of processing familiar stimuli, and therefore judge 
objects we have encountered before as more positive. This effect is known as the mere-exposure 
effect (Zajonc, 1968). Similarly, when we are faced with the question of whether we have 
encountered a stimulus before, we might rely on the ease of processing that stimulus and 
interpret fluency as a cue for familiarity (Jacoby & Kelley, 1987; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; 
Whittlesea & Williams, 2000, 2001). The theoretical idea underlying both phenomena is that the 
experienced fluency of processing a stimulus is misattributed to a specific characteristic of that 
stimulus (e.g., valence, familiarity) and used to answer a question that we are otherwise unsure 
how to answer (see Loersch & Payne, 2011). 
The present research focuses on a conceptually related phenomenon: the positivity-
familiarity effect (e.g., Corneille, Monin, & Pleyers, 2005; Garcia-Marques, Mackie, Claypool, 
& Garcia-Marques, 2004; Housley, Claypool, Garcia-Marques, & Mackie, 2010; Monin, 2003; 
Phaf & Rotteveel, 2005). The positivity-familiarity effect suggests that people use positive affect 
as a cue to answer the question of whether a stimulus has been encountered before. Expanding 
on recent failures to replicate the phenomenon (Weil, Palma, & Gawronski, 2017) and broader 
concerns about the reproducibility of social psychological effects (Open Science Collaboration, 
2015), we investigated the positivity-familiarity effect under various conditions derived from 
extant theories of misattribution. The broader goal of this research was to identify conditions that 
produce reliable positivity-familiarity effects and distinguish them from conditions under which 
positivity-familiarity effects are weaker and less reliable. Although previous research has 
identified a broad range of theoretically significant moderators of the mere-exposure effect (for a 
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meta-analysis, see Montoya, Horton, Vevea, Citkowicz, & Lauber, 2017), much less is known 
about the boundary conditions of positivity-familiarity effects. By identifying theoretically 
significant moderators of the positivity-familiarity effect, the current findings provide valuable 
insights not only into the reproducibility of the effect under different conditions; they also 
impose valuable empirical constraints for extant theories of misattribution effects. Insofar as a 
given factor has different effects on different misattribution phenomena, such findings might 
question the assumption that they are driven by the same underlying mechanism. 
The Positivity-Familiarity Effect 
Conceptually, the positivity-familiarity effect can be interpreted as a reversed mere 
exposure effect, suggesting an intrinsic relationship between familiarity and positivity (Rotteveel 
& Phaf, 2007). The central idea underlying this effect is that, because familiarity evokes positive 
affect, people may show a reverse tendency to infer familiarity from positive affect (e.g., Monin, 
2003). The positivity-familiarity effect has been found for attractive faces (Corneille et al., 2005; 
Monin, 2003), positive words (Monin, 2003), and smiling faces (Baudouin, Gilibert, Sansone, 
Tiberghien, 2000; Garcia-Marques et al., 2004; Lander & Metcalfe, 2007), which were judged as 
more familiar compared to less attractive faces (Corneille et al., 2005; Monin, 2003), neutral and 
negative words (Monin, 2003), and faces with neutral expressions (Garcia-Marques et al., 2004). 
These studies demonstrate that inherent positive features of stimuli (e.g., attractiveness of faces) 
influence judgments of familiarity (cf. Verde, Stone, Hatch, & Schnall, 2010). However, the 
positivity-familiarity effect has also been found when positivity was manipulated contextually 
(e.g., Claypool, Hall, Mackie, & Garcia-Marques, 2008; Garcia-Marques et al., 2004; Housley et 
al., 2010; Phaf & Rotteveel, 2005). The latter findings suggest that, even when target stimuli 
themselves do not elicit positive affect, positive affect elicited by a different source is often 
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misattributed to the familiarity of the targets. Such misattribution effects have been found when 
positive affect was elicited by subliminal presentations of smiley faces (Garcia-Marques et al., 
2004), supra- and subliminal presentations of positive words (Phaf & Rotteveel, 2005), 
contraction of the zygomaticus muscle (Phaf & Rotteveel, 2005), and reading an article designed 
to induce positive mood (Claypool et al., 2008). 
Weil et al. (2017) found contextually induced positivity-familiarity effects using a variant 
of the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). In the 
standard version of the AMP, participants are briefly presented with a positive or negative prime 
stimulus, followed by a neutral Chinese ideograph (see Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). Participants’ 
task is to indicate if they find the Chinese ideograph visually more pleasant or visually less 
pleasant than the average Chinese ideograph. In Weil et al.’s modified AMP, participants were 
presented with positive, neutral, and negative primes, and asked to indicate if they find the 
Chinese ideograph more familiar or less familiar than the average Chinese ideograph. Results 
showed that ideographs preceded by positive primes were judged as more familiar compared to 
ideographs preceded by neutral and negative primes. These results are in line with the proposed 
misattribution mechanism underlying priming effects in the AMP (Gawronski & Ye, 2014; 
Loersch & Payne, 2011) and the positivity-familiarity effect (e.g., Monin, 2003). 
 Yet, despite the use of relatively large sample sizes, the studies by Weil et al. (2017) found 
a statistically significant positivity-familiarity effect only in two out of their seven experiments. 
In light of recent debates about the reproducibility of social psychological findings (e.g., Earp & 
Trafimow, 2015; Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015; Open Science Collaboration, 2015), these 
results might raise concerns about the robustness of the positivity-familiarity effect. However, 
rather than suggesting that positivity-familiarity effects are not reproducible, Weil et al.’s (2017) 
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findings might indicate that positivity-familiarity effects depend on theoretically meaningful 
boundary conditions (see Stroebe & Strack, 2014; Van Bavel, Mende-Siedlecki, Brady, & 
Reinero, 2016). 
Moderators of the Positivity-Familiarity Effect 
One condition that may influence the positivity-familiarity effect is the broader context in 
which stimuli are judged with respect to their familiarity. Such moderating influences of context 
have already been demonstrated for mere-exposure effects (e.g., Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & 
Wänke, 2009; Freitas, Azizian, Travers, & Berry, 2005). For example, mere-exposure effects 
have been found to be limited to conditions of non-analytic processing and eliminated by 
analytic processing (Whittlesea & Price, 2001; see also Halberstadt, 2010; Halberstadt & Catty, 
2008). Thus, to the extent that mere-exposure effects and positivity-familiarity effects are 
conceptually related phenomena that are driven by the same underlying processes, positivity-
familiarity effects might similarly depend on non-analytic processing strategies (see 
Alexopoulos, Lemonnier, & Fiedler, 2017). 
In line with this hypothesis, Rotteveel and Phaf (2007) showed that the influence of 
positivity on judgments of familiarity depends on participants’ mood, in that positive mood 
amplified and negative mood reduced positivity-familiarity effects. According to the authors, 
positive mood induces a non-analytic processing mode, whereas negative mood leads to an 
analytic mode of processing. Because analytic processing interferes with misattribution effects 
by reducing reliance on “gut feelings” (see Eder & Deutsch, 2015; De Houwer & Smith, 2013), 
any factor promoting analytic processing (e.g., negative mood) may reduce or eliminate 
positivity-familiarity effects. 
These considerations might be important to understand the mixed results by Weil et al. 
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(2017). In the five studies that failed to produce a significant positivity-familiarity effect, 
participants initially completed a stimulus exposure task that suggested a normatively accurate 
response to the familiarity judgments in the AMP (Experiments 1-5). A significant positivity-
familiarity effect was found only in two studies that did not include a stimulus exposure task 
before the AMP (Experiments 6-7). One possible interpretation of this finding is that the 
stimulus exposure task led to enhanced analytic processing, because the context suggested 
normatively accurate responses and participants might have invested cognitive effort to 
distinguish between familiar and unfamiliar stimuli (rather than relying on their “gut feelings”). 
However, any such explanation remains speculative in the absence of research with direct 
experimental manipulations of the relevant contextual factors. Indeed, the validity of this post-
hoc explanation seems questionable in light of several other studies in which similar contextual 
conditions had no detrimental influence on the positivity-familiarity effect. For example, Garcia-
Marques et al. (2004) as well as Phaf and Rotteveel (2005) found reliable positivity-familiarity 
effects although both studies included a stimulus exposure task prior to the familiarity judgment 
task. Thus, one aim of the present research was to directly test whether the positivity-familiarity 
effect depends on task-context conditions that do versus do not suggest a normatively accurate 
response to the question of whether a given stimulus is familiar or unfamiliar. To the extent that 
task contexts that suggest a normatively accurate response enhance analytic processing, 
positivity-familiarity effects should be weaker (or eliminated) under such task context 
conditions. 
A potential explanation for the seemingly inconsistent effects of task context is that 
misattribution of positive affect depends on other moderators in addition to the effects of 
processing strategies. One such moderator might be the salience of the true source of one’s 
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affective response. Previous research suggests that misattribution effects are reduced or 
eliminated when the likelihood for source confusion is reduced, that is, when the true source is 
more salient than the apparent source (e.g., Claypool et al. 2008; Jones, Fazio, & Olson, 2009; 
Oikawa, Aarts, & Oikawa, 2011; Ruys, Aarts, Papies, Oikawa, & Oikawa, 2012; White & 
Knight, 1984; but see Mierop, Hütter, Stahl, & Corneille, 2018). Thus, when positive affect is 
induced contextually by a prime, longer prime presentations involve higher salience of the prime, 
which might reduce a misattribution of prime-related affect to features of the target (see 
Bornstein, 1989; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; but see Newell, & Shanks, 2007). This hypothesis 
might also explain the discrepant effects of task context in previous research. For example, 
previous studies that found a positivity-familiarity effect under task context conditions that 
presumably enhance analytic processing have used relatively short prime presentations (e.g., 
Garcia-Marques et al., 2004). In contrast, studies that did not find a positivity-familiarity effect 
under similar task context conditions have used prime presentations that were considerably 
longer (e.g., Weil et al., 2017).1 Consequently, another aim of the present research was to 
investigate the role of prime duration as a moderator of the positivity-familiarity effect.  
Experiment 1 
To investigate the influence of task context on the positivity-familiarity effect, we 
employed a bogus subliminal task (see Monin, 2003; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2007; Westerman, 
Lloyd, & Miller, 2002) to manipulate the perceived existence of a correct answer to the question 
of whether a given target stimulus is familiar or unfamiliar. This task allowed us to manipulate 
the perceived existence of a correct answer without introducing a possibility for true recognition 
effects. After the bogus subliminal task, participants completed a modified variant of the AMP 
                                                          
1 Whereas Garcia-Marques et al. (2004) used prime presentation times of 30 ms or less, Weil et al. (2017) used 
prime presentation times of 75 ms.  
POSITIVITY-FAMILIARITY EFFECT  9 
designed to measure positivity-familiarity effects (Weil et al., 2017). Participants were told that 
the first part of the study would include very brief, allegedly subliminal presentations of either 
numbers or Chinese ideographs. Once they completed this part, they were told that the first part 
of the study is over. The second part of the study was purportedly unrelated to the first part and 
concerned with the familiarity of Chinese ideographs. That is, participants were not explicitly 
instructed to link the first part of the study to the second part. Because we did not present any 
Chinese ideographs in the first part, all ideographs in the second part were in fact novel. In the 
second part, participants were asked to judge the familiarity of the Chinese ideographs. 
Following the standard protocol of the AMP, each target ideograph in the second part was 
preceded by a positive, a negative, or a neutral prime. Whereas bogus subliminal presentation of 
numbers was assumed to be irrelevant for familiarity judgments of the Chinese ideographs, 
bogus subliminal presentation of Chinese ideographs should suggest the existence of normatively 
correct responses in the familiarity judgment task. Thus, to the extent that task contexts that 
suggest a normatively correct response induce analytic processing (Whittlesea & Price, 2001), 
positivity-familiarity effects should be significantly weaker (or eliminated) when the bogus 
subliminal task ostensibly included judgment-relevant stimuli (i.e., Chinese ideographs) than 
when it ostensibly included judgment-irrelevant stimuli (i.e., numbers).  
Methods 
Participants and design. Three-hundred participants (172 female, 123 male, 3 other, 2 not 
reported; mean age = 40.04 years) were recruited via Prolific Academic (see Peer, Brandimarte, 
Samat, & Acquisti, 2017) to participate in a study on “visual distraction and judgment.” 
Participants were eligible to sign up for the experiment only if (a) their country of residence was 
registered as the United Kingdom, (b) they had completed at least 100 studies on Prolific 
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Academic, and (c) held an approval record of at least 95%. Participants were paid £0.84 (approx. 
$1.00) for their participation. The study consisted of a 3 (Prime Valence: positive vs. neutral vs. 
negative) × 2 (Bogus Subliminal Presentation Task: judgment-relevant vs. judgment-irrelevant) 
mixed design, with the first factor being manipulated within-participants and the last one 
between-participants.2  
Bogus subliminal presentation task. The first part of the study was introduced as being 
concerned with unconscious perception. Participants were informed that they will be presented 
with a set of Chinese symbols (judgment-relevant condition) or with a set of numbers (judgment-
irrelevant condition) on a computer screen. They were further told that the stimuli will be 
presented subliminally, that is, “they will appear so quickly that you probably will not be able to 
see them or even be aware of their presence.” Participants were informed that the stimuli will be 
masked and that their task is to keep their eyes on the screen throughout the entire task. The task 
included 30 presentations of three visual masks that were presented in sequential order (the first 
one for 250ms, the second one for 35ms, and the last one for 250ms). Each of the three visual 
masks consisted of a rectangle, filled with different combinations of number signs, ampersands, 
and percentage signs. Each sequence was interspaced by a blank screen for 1000ms 
(see Westerman et al., 2002). To keep the cover story plausible, participants were initially 
presented with six foil stimuli (i.e., Chinese ideographs or numbers, depending on the condition) 
at decreasing durations (119ms, 102ms, 85ms, 68ms, 51ms, and 34ms). They appeared instead of 
the second mask in the sequence of masks. These foil stimuli were not presented in the 
                                                          
2 The sample size for each study was determined beforehand with the requirement of at least 50 participants per cell. 
Slightly larger samples resulted from participants who took part in the experiment but did not request their 
compensation immediately after completing the study. If these participants asked for their compensation later, it was 
granted retroactively. Sensitivity analyses (GPower 3.1.9.2), assuming a power of (1-β) = .80, revealed that the 
experiments were sensitive to detect effect sizes of ηp2 > .01 for the main statistical effect of interest. The data for 
each experiment were collected in one shot without prior statistical analyses. We report all data exclusions, all 
manipulations, and all measures. All materials and data are available at https://osf.io/3m25w/. 
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subsequent part of the study. The 24 remaining trials showed only the three masking stimuli 
without any stimuli in between.  
AMP. The second part of the study was introduced as being concerned with judgments of 
Chinese ideographs. The procedure followed the general recommendations by Payne et al. 
(2005), with the exception of the familiarity judgment task. Participants were instructed to judge 
the familiarity of Chinese ideographs. They were told to indicate whether the Chinese ideograph 
seems familiar or unfamiliar. On each trial of the task, participants were first presented with a 
warning signal (+++) for 500ms, which was replaced by a prime stimulus of either positive, 
negative, or neutral valence for 75ms. The presentation of the prime was followed by a blank 
screen for 125ms, after which a Chinese ideograph appeared for 100ms. The Chinese ideograph 
was then replaced by a pattern mask, and participants were asked to indicate whether the Chinese 
ideograph seems familiar or unfamiliar to them. The pattern mask remained on the screen until 
participants gave their response. The next trial started immediately afterwards. As prime stimuli, 
we used 8 positive, 8 negative, and 8 neutral images from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). The selected primes were identical to the ones 
used in Weil et al. (2017). Using Lang et al.’s (2008) normative data, the positive primes had a 
mean valence rating of Mval = 7.41 (SDval = .37), a mean arousal rating of Marous = 4.10 (SDarous 
= .57) and a mean dominance rating of Mdom = .58 (SDdom = 2.67); the neutral primes had a mean 
valence rating of Mval = 4.63 (SDval = .13), a mean arousal rating of Marous = 1.46 (SDarous = .49) 
and a mean dominance rating of Mdom = .61 (SDdom = 2.63); and the negative primes had a mean 
valence rating of Mval = 2.88 (SDval = .52), a mean arousal rating of Marous = 4.40 (SDarous = .72) 
and a mean dominance rating of Mdom = .49 (SDdom = 1.32). Each prime was presented three 
times, summing up to a total of 72 trials. As target stimuli, we used 72 Chinese ideographs from 
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Payne et al. (2005). Order of trials and prime-target combinations were randomized by the 
computer for each participant and organized in three blocks of 24 trials. In line with the original 
instructions by Payne et al. (2005), participants were told that the images can sometimes bias 
people’s responses, and that they should try their best not to let the images bias their judgments 
of the Chinese ideographs. 
Results 
Data from two participants were not recorded due to technical problems and data from one 
participant were incomplete and excluded from the analysis. Following procedures by Weil et al. 
(2017), we also excluded data from 51 participants who used the same response key on more 
than 90% of the AMP trials (see Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009). The 
following analysis is based on the remaining 246 participants. The proportion of familiar 
responses towards the ideographs served as the dependent variable. A 3 (Prime Valence) × 2 
(Bogus Subliminal Presentation Task) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
Prime Valence, F(2, 488) = 14.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .06, (see Figure 1). To specify this main effect, 
we conducted within-subjects ANOVAs comparing each level of Prime Valence. The analyses 
revealed that targets were judged as more familiar when they followed a positive prime than 
when they followed a negative prime, F(1, 245) = 23.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. Moreover, targets 
that followed neutral primes were judged as more familiar than targets that followed negative 
primes, F(1, 245) = 13.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .05. However, judgments of targets that followed 
neutral primes did not significantly differ from judgments of targets that followed positive 
primes, F(1, 245) = 2.51, p = .11, ηp2 = .01. Counter to our predictions, the judgmental relevance 
of the stimuli in the bogus subliminal presentation task did not moderate the main effect of Prime 
Valence, F(2, 488) = .22, p = .81, ηp2 = .00, which was statistically significant in both the 
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judgment-irrelevant, F(2, 242) = 7.23, p = .001, ηp2 = .06, and the judgment-relevant condition, 
F(2, 246) = 7.61, p = .001, ηp2 = .06. To reduce the possibility of false-positive results, we 
performed a False Detection Rate (FDR) correction (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) for all 
analyses to correct for multiple comparisons. All statistically significant results remained 
significant after FDR correction. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 did not confirm our hypothesis that the positivity-familiarity effect depends 
on the judgmental relevance of the stimuli that were allegedly presented in the subliminal 
presentation task. Instead, we found a significant positivity-familiarity effect regardless of 
whether the stimuli in the bogus subliminal presentation task were relevant or irrelevant for the 
familiarity judgment task. One potential interpretation of this finding is that the positivity-
familiarity effect is unaffected by analytic processing. However, another interpretation is that the 
current manipulation failed to produce a sufficiently strong level of analytic processing to 
interfere with the positivity-familiarity effect. For example, it is possible that the judgmental 
relevance of the stimuli in the subliminal presentation task did not influence the positivity-
familiarity effect, because our instructions treated the bogus subliminal task and the AMP task as 
unrelated. Experiment 2 aimed to address this question. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 with two exceptions. First, instead of being 
informed that the bogus subliminal presentation task included either numbers or Chinese 
ideographs, all participants were told that the bogus subliminal presentation task included 
Chinese ideographs. Second, instead of asking all participants to judge the familiarity of the 
ideographs, half of the participants were asked to judge the ideographs as familiar versus 
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unfamiliar (as in Experiment 1), while the remaining half were asked to indicate whether the 
ideographs had been presented to them in the subliminal presentation task before. We assumed 
that direct connections between the two tasks would increase the likelihood of analytic 
processing due to participants’ effort to correctly identify ostensibly presented ideographs, which 
should reduce or eliminate the positivity-familiarity effect.  
Methods 
Participants and design. Three-hundred participants (189 female, 109 male, 2 not 
reported; mean age = 40.45 years) were recruited via Prolific Academic. Eligibility for 
participation was limited to individuals who had not participated in Experiment 1. The 
compensation and all eligibility criteria were identical to Experiment 1. The study consisted of a 
3 (Prime Valence: positive vs. neutral vs. negative) × 2 (Judgmental Task: familiar/unfamiliar vs. 
old/new) mixed design, with the first factor being manipulated within-participants and the last 
one between-participants. 
Procedure. The procedure and materials were identical to Experiment 1, with the 
exception that all participants were told that the bogus subliminal presentation task included 
Chinese ideographs (identical to the judgment-relevant condition in Experiment 1). Half of the 
participants were asked to judge the ideographs in terms of their familiarity (i.e., familiar vs. 
unfamiliar); the remaining half were asked to indicate whether the ideographs had been 
presented to them in the subliminal presentation task before (i.e., old vs. new). 
Results 
Data from one participant were not recorded; data from another participant were 
incomplete and excluded from the analysis; and one participant asked to be removed from the 
data set after completion of the study. In addition, data from 37 participants who used the same 
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response key on more than 90% of the AMP trials were excluded from the analysis (see Deutsch 
et al., 2009; Weil et al., 2017). The following analysis is based on the remaining 260 participants. 
The proportion of familiar/old judgments served as the dependent variable. A 3 (Prime Valence) 
× 2 (Judgmental Task) mixed ANOVA revealed no statistically significant effects (all ps > .053). 
Judgments of the targets did not significantly differ as a function of Prime Valence regardless of 
whether the targets had to be judged as familiar/unfamiliar, F(2, 238) = 1.26, p = .285, ηp² = .01, 
or as old/new, F(2, 278) = .798, p = .451, ηp² = .006. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 failed to obtain a significant positivity-familiarity effect regardless of 
whether participants judged the target stimuli as familiar/unfamiliar or old/new. Interestingly, 
prime valence did not influence target judgments even when the targets were judged as 
familiar/unfamiliar. This outcome differs from the results of Experiment 1, which obtained a 
significant positivity-familiarity effect under identical conditions. These conflicting findings 
support the concern that the positivity-familiarity effect may be more fragile than previously 
assumed and limited to particular contextual conditions.  
A potential explanation for the inconsistent findings is that, when participants were 
allegedly presented with judgment-relevant stimuli in a prior task, the requirement to judge the 
targets as familiar/unfamiliar may be ambiguous in the sense that it can be interpreted as related 
or unrelated to the preceding stimulus presentation task. To the extent that the familiarity 
judgment task is interpreted as related to the stimulus presentation task, analytic processing may 
be enhanced, which should lead to an attenuation of the positivity-familiarity effect (as in 
Experiment 2). Yet, to the extent that the familiarity judgment task is interpreted as unrelated to 
the stimulus presentation task, analytic processing may be relatively low, providing conditions 
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that support a misattribution of positive affect to familiarity (as in Experiment 1). A requirement 
to indicate whether the targets had been presented before is less ambiguous, because it explicitly 
refers to the stimulus presentation task. As such, it may enhance analytic processing in a more 
consistent fashion. We will return to this issue in Experiment 5. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 investigated whether prime duration moderates the positivity-familiarity 
effect. When positivity is induced contextually by primes, longer prime presentations increase 
the salience of the primes, which might reduce the misattribution of prime features to the target 
stimuli. Conversely, shorter prime presentations decrease the salience of the primes, which might 
increase the misattribution of prime features to the target stimuli (e.g., Jones et al. 2009; Oikawa 
et al., 2011). Experiment 3 investigated the influence of prime duration on the positivity-
familiarity effect using prime presentation times of either 20ms or 200ms.3 Payne et al. (2005) 
found no influence of prime duration and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) on the effect of 
prime valence on valence judgments of targets, with prime duration varying between 75ms and 
1500ms and SOAs varying between 100ms and 1500ms. Accordingly, only prime durations of 
less than 75 ms might have the potential to substantially increase misattribution effects. 
Moreover, misattribution of positivity to judgments of familiarity has been found using relatively 
short prime presentations of 30 ms or less (e.g., Garcia-Marques et al., 2004). Based on these 
findings, we chose 20ms as short prime duration and 200 ms as long prime duration. 
                                                          
3 Because graphic card characteristics, physical characteristics of the monitor, and monitor settings influence 
presentation times, 20 ms is only an approximation of actual presentation times. The average time of actual prime 
presentations in the 20ms condition in Experiment 3 was Mduration = 19.51, SDduration = 6.34. 
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Methods 
Participants and design. Three-hundred-and-three participants (117 female, 179 male, 3 
other, 4 not reported; mean age = 35.47 years) were recruited via Prolific Academic. Participants 
were eligible to sign up for the experiment only if their country of residence was registered as the 
United States. All other eligibility criteria and compensation were identical to Experiments 1 and 
2. The study consisted of a 3 (Prime Valence: positive vs. neutral vs. negative) × 2 (Prime 
Duration: 20ms vs. 200ms) mixed design, with the first factor being manipulated within-
participants and the last one between-participants. 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, the only exceptions being: (a) 
Experiment 3 did not include a bogus subliminal presentation task prior to the AMP, and (b) 
primes where presented either for 20ms (short prime duration) or for 200ms (long prime 
duration). All participants were asked to indicate whether the Chinese ideographs seem more or 
less familiar than an average Chinese ideograph. 
Results 
Data from four participants were incomplete and excluded from the analysis. In addition, 
we excluded data from 13 participants who used the same response key on more than 90% of the 
AMP trials (see Deutsch et al., 2009; Weil et al., 2017). The following analysis is based on the 
remaining 286 participants. The proportion of familiar responses towards the ideographs served 
as the dependent variable. A 3 (Prime Valence) × 2 (Prime Duration) mixed ANOVA revealed a 
marginally significant main effect of Prime Valence, F(2, 568) = 2.61, p = .08, ηp2 = .01, 
qualified by a significant two-way interaction of Prime Valence and Prime Duration, F(2, 568) = 
4.77, p = .009, ηp2 = .02, (see Figure 3). Separate within-subjects ANOVAs within the short 
prime duration condition and the long prime duration condition revealed that the main effect of 
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Prime Valence was significant for long prime duration, F(2, 276) = 4.94, p = .008, ηp2 = .04, but 
not for short prime duration, F(2, 292) = .30, p = .74, ηp2 = .00. For the long prime duration 
condition, within-subjects ANOVAs comparing each level of Prime Valence further revealed 
that targets were judged as more familiar when they followed a positive prime than when they 
followed a negative prime, F(1, 138) = 7.23, p = .008, ηp2 = .05. Moreover, targets that followed 
neutral primes were judged as more familiar than targets that followed negative primes, F(1, 
138) = 4.15, p = .04, ηp2 = .03. However, judgments of targets that followed neutral primes did 
not differ from judgments of targets that followed positive primes, F(1, 138) = 1.41, p = .24, ηp2 
= .01. All statistically significant results remained significant after FDR correction, the only 
exception being the comparison between targets that followed neutral primes and targets that 
followed negative primes in the long prime duration condition. 
Discussion 
Contrary to our predictions, long prime presentations led to a stronger (rather than weaker) 
positivity-familiarity effect than short prime presentations, the latter of which eliminated the 
positivity-familiarity effect. This finding stands in contrast to the idea that long prime 
presentations, compared to short prime presentations, increase the salience of the primes, which 
might interfere with a misattribution of prime features to the target stimuli. The results of 
Experiment 3 are inconsistent with this hypothesis, and instead suggest that the positivity-
familiarity effect is more pronounced for long compared to short prime presentations.  
A potential explanation of this unexpected finding is that long presentations of the primes 
elicit stronger affective reactions compared to short presentations. Thus, to the extent that effects 
of positive affect on judgments of familiarity increase as a function of affect strength, long prime 
presentations may lead to stronger positivity-familiarity effects compared to short prime 
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presentations. Experiment 4 aimed to address this possibility by comparing effects of prime 
valence on judgments of target familiarity and target valence. 
Experiment 4 
To investigate the presumed role of affect strength in the effect of prime duration on the 
positivity-familiarity effect, Experiment 4 aimed to replicate the unexpected findings of 
Experiment 3, including an additional valence judgment condition. To the extent that the effects 
of prime duration in Experiment 3 are due to differences in affect strength, effects of prime 
valence on target judgments should increase as a function of prime duration regardless of 
whether the targets have to be judged in terms of their familiarity or in terms of their valence.  
Methods 
Participants and design. Six-hundred-and-nine participants (315 female, 281 male, 7 
other, 6 not reported; mean age = 35.47 years) were recruited via Prolific Academic. Eligibility 
for participation was limited to individuals who had not participated in Experiment 3. The 
compensation and all other eligibility criteria were identical to Experiment 3.4 The study 
consisted of a 3 (Prime Valence: positive vs. neutral vs. negative) × 2 (Prime Duration: 20ms vs. 
200ms) × 2 (Task: valence judgment vs. familiarity judgment) mixed design, with the first factor 
being manipulated within-participants and the last two factors between-participants.5 
AMP. The procedure was largely identical to Experiment 3, the only exception being the 
additional manipulation of the judgment task. In the valence-judgment condition, participants’ 
task was to indicate whether they considered the Chinese ideographs as more pleasant or less 
                                                          
4 After collecting the data of 132 participants with the eligibly criterion of having completed at least 100 studies on 
Prolific Academic, we had to lower the criterion to at least 10 studies to increase the pool of potential participants. 
5 The average time of actual prime presentations in the 20ms condition in Experiment 4 was Mduration = 18.94, 
SDduration = 7.11. 
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pleasant than the average Chinese ideograph. In the familiarity-judgment condition, participants’ 
task was to indicate whether they considered the Chinese ideograph as more familiar or less 
familiar than the average Chinese ideograph. 
Results 
Data from nine participants were incomplete and excluded from the analysis. In addition, 
we excluded data from 27 participants who used the same response key on more than 90% of the 
AMP trials (see Deutsch et al., 2009; Weil et al., 2017). The following analysis is based on the 
remaining 573 participants. The proportion of pleasant/familiar responses towards the ideographs 
served as the dependent variable. A 3 (Prime Valence) × 2 (Prime Duration) × 2 (Task) mixed 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Prime Valence, F(2, 1138) = 51.46, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.08, a significant main effect of Task, F(1, 569) = 23.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .04, a significant two-
way interaction of Prime Valence and Prime Duration, F(2, 1138) = 6.85, p = .001, ηp2 = .01, 
and a significant two-way interaction of Prime Valence and Task, F(2, 1138) = 19.08, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .01. These effects were qualified by a significant three-way interaction of Prime Valence, 
Prime Duration, and Task, F(2, 1138) = 4.24, p = .02, ηp2 = .01 (see Figure 4). To decompose 
this interaction, we conducted separate 2 (Prime Valence) × 2 (Prime Duration) ANOVAs for the 
valence-judgment and familiarity-judgment condition, respectively. 
In the valence-judgment condition, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Prime 
Valence, F(2, 568) = 50.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .15, qualified by a significant two-way interaction of 
Prime Valence and Prime Duration, F(2, 568) = 8.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .03. Although the main 
effect of Prime Valence was statistically significant in both the short prime duration condition, 
F(2, 268) = 15.22, p < .001, ηp2 = .10, and the long prime duration condition, F(2, 300) = 37.51, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .20, the effect of Prime Valence was considerable larger for long compared to 
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short prime presentations, as indicated by the significant two-way interaction. Separate within-
subjects ANOVAs comparing each level of Prime Valence within the short prime duration 
condition and the long prime duration condition further revealed that, in the short prime 
presentation condition, targets were evaluated more favorable when they followed positive 
primes than when they followed negative primes, F(1, 134) = 24.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .15. Targets 
that followed neutral primes were evaluated more favorable than targets that followed negative 
primes, F(1, 134) = 12.18, p = .001, ηp2 = .08, and evaluations of targets that followed neutral 
primes where less favorable than evaluations of targets that followed positive primes, F(1, 134) = 
6.15, p = .014, ηp2 = .04. Moreover, in the long prime presentation condition, targets were 
evaluated more favorable when they followed positive primes than when they followed negative 
primes, F(1, 150) = 49.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .25. Targets that followed neutral primes were 
evaluated more favorable than targets that followed negative primes, F(1, 150) = 29.44, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .16, and evaluations of targets that followed neutral primes where less favorable than 
evaluations of targets that followed positive primes, F(1, 150) = 19.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .12.  
In the familiarity-judgment condition, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
Prime Valence, F(2, 570) = 5.88, p = .003, ηp2 = .02. Within-subjects ANOVAs comparing each 
level of Prime Valence further indicated that targets were judged as more familiar when they 
followed positive primes than when they followed negative primes, F(1, 286) = 11.37, p = .001, 
ηp2 = .04. Targets following neutral primes were judged marginally less familiar than targets 
following positive primes, F(1, 286) = 3.79, p = .053, ηp2 = .01, and did not differ from target 
judgments following negative primes, F(1, 286) = 2.34, p = .13, ηp2 = .01. The interaction of 
Prime Valence and Prime Duration was not statistically significant, F(2, 570) = .26, p = .77, ηp2 
= .00. All statistically significant results remained significant after FDR correction. 
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Discussion 
Consistent with the post-hoc interpretation of prime duration effects in terms of affect 
strength, long prime presentations led to stronger effects of prime valence on judgments of target 
valence than short prime presentations. Yet, prime duration did not moderate the effect of prime 
valence on judgments of target familiarity. Together with the findings of Experiment 3, these 
findings suggest that the positivity-familiarity effect is reliable for long prime presentations and 
more fragile (but not necessarily eliminated) for short prime presentations. To further explore the 
role of prime duration and relate it to the obtained effects of task context in Experiments 1 and 2, 
Experiment 5 combined a within-subjects manipulation of prime-duration with a manipulation of 
task context. 
Experiment 5 
The aim of Experiment 5 was two-fold: (a) to further explore the impact of prime duration 
on the positivity-familiarity effect using a within-participant manipulation and (b) to shed further 
light on the influence of task context on the positivity-familiarity effect, as investigated in 
Experiments 1 and 2. To this end, the task context manipulation in Experiment 5 combined the 
judgment-irrelevant condition from Experiment 1 (using numbers in the bogus subliminal 
presentation task and familiar/unfamiliar judgments in the AMP) with the judgment-relevant 
condition from Experiment 2 (using Chinese ideographs in the bogus subliminal presentation 
task and old/new judgments in the AMP). Whereas in the former condition, there is no basis for 
participants to assume a normatively accurate response to the targets in the AMP (which should 
promote non-analytic processing), the latter condition unambiguously suggests the existence of a 
normatively accurately response to the targets (which should promote analytic processing). 
Based on the results of the preceding studies, we expected to observe stronger positivity-
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familiarity effects (a) when the task context is judgment-irrelevant than when it is judgment-
relevant and (b) when prime presentations are long rather than short. 
Methods 
Participants and design. Three-hundred-and-four participants (117 female, 183 male, 2 
other, 2 not reported; mean age = 32.04 years) were recruited via Prolific Academic. Eligibility 
for participation was limited to individuals who had not participated in Experiments 3 and 4. 
Participants were eligible to sign up for the experiment if they had completed at least 10 studies 
on Prolific Academic; all other eligibility criteria were identical to Experiment 3 and 4. 
Participants were paid £1.25 (approx. $1.50) for their participation. The study consisted of a 3 
(Prime Valence: positive vs. neutral vs. negative) × 2 (Prime Duration: 20ms vs. 200ms) × 2 
(Task Context: judgment-relevant vs. judgment-irrelevant) mixed design, with the first two 
factors being manipulated within-participants and the last factor between-participants.6 
Bogus subliminal presentation task. Participants were informed that they will be 
presented with a set of Chinese symbols (judgment-relevant condition) or with a set of numbers 
(judgment-irrelevant condition) on a computer screen. The procedural details of the bogus 
subliminal presentation task were identical to Experiment 1. 
AMP. The procedural details of the AMP were identical to Experiment 1, the only 
exception being that prime duration was manipulated within-participants. Each prime (8 positive, 
8 negative, 8 neutral) was shown six times to participants, three times for 20ms and three times 
for 200ms, summing up to a total of 144 trials. Accordingly, 144 Chinese ideographs were used 
as target stimuli. The order of trials and prime-target combinations were randomized by the 
computer for each participant and organized in three blocks of 48 trials. In the judgment-relevant 
                                                          
6 The average time of actual prime presentations in the 20ms condition in Experiment 5 was Mduration = 19.68, 
SDduration = 9.32. 
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condition, participants were asked to indicate whether Chinese ideographs are old/new. In the 
judgment-irrelevant condition, participants were asked to judge whether Chinese ideographs 
seem familiar/unfamiliar. 
Results 
Data from four participants were incomplete and excluded from the analysis. In addition, 
we excluded data from 19 participants who used the same response key on more than 90% of the 
AMP trials (see Deutsch et al., 2009; Weil et al., 2017). The following analysis is based on the 
remaining 281 participants. The proportion of old/familiar responses towards the ideographs 
served as the dependent variable. A 3 (Prime Valence) × 2 (Prime Duration) × 2 (Task Context) 
mixed-model ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Prime Valence, F(2, 558) = 5.42, p = 
.005, ηp2 = .02, qualified by a significant two-way interaction of Prime Valence and Task 
Context, F(2, 558) = 6.80, p = .001, ηp2 = .02 (see Figure 5).  
In the judgment-irrelevant condition, there was a significant main effect of Prime Valence, 
F(2, 276) = 8.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .06, and this main effect was statistically significant in both the 
long presentation condition, F(2, 276) = 7.36, p = .001, ηp² = .05, and the short presentation 
condition, F(2, 276) = 3.45, p = .033, ηp² = .02. Whereas the former effect remained significant 
after FDR correction, the latter effect was only marginally significant after FDR correction. 
Within-subjects ANOVAs comparing each level of Prime Valence further revealed that targets 
were judged as more familiar when they followed positive primes than when they followed 
negative primes, F(1, 138) = 13.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. Moreover, targets that followed positive 
primes were judged as more familiar than targets that followed neutral primes, F(1, 138) = 10.42, 
p = .002, ηp2 = .07. However, judgments of targets that followed neutral primes did not differ 
from judgments of targets that followed negative primes, F(1, 138) = 1.82, p = .18, ηp2 = .01.  
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In the judgment-relevant condition, the main effect of Prime Valence was marginally 
significant, F(2, 282) = 2.96, p = .05, ηp2 = .02, and non-significant after FDR correction.  
The omnibus ANOVA also revealed a theoretically uninteresting main effect of Prime 
Duration, F(1, 279) = 4.76, p = .03, ηp2 = .02. More importantly, neither the two-way interaction 
between Prime Valence and Prime Duration, F(2, 558) = .21, p = .81, ηp² = .001, nor the three-
way interaction of Prime Valence, Prime Duration, and Task Context were statistically 
significant, F(2, 558) = 1.46, p = .23, ηp2 = .01. Unless indicated otherwise, all statistically 
significant effects remained significant after FDR correction. 
Discussion 
In line with our predictions, Experiment 5 showed a significant positivity-familiarity effect 
only when the task context did not suggest the existence of normatively accurate responses to the 
targets in the familiarity judgments task. In the current study, a significant positivity-familiarity 
effect emerged only when participants were allegedly presented with numbers in the subliminal 
presentation task and then judged the Chinese ideographs in the AMP as familiar or unfamiliar. 
In contrast, there was no evidence for a positivity-familiarity effect when participants were 
allegedly presented with Chinese ideographs in the subliminal presentation task and then judged 
the Chinese ideographs in the AMP as old or new. Consistent with the results of Experiment 4, 
but inconsistent with the results of Experiment 3, prime duration did not influence the positivity-
familiarity effect. When the task context did not suggest the existence of normatively accurate 
responses to the targets, prime valence influenced familiarity judgments of the targets regardless 
of whether the primes were presented for long or short durations. 
Bayes Factor Analysis on Combined Data 
Because Experiments 1, 2, and 5 revealed inconsistent results with respect to the role of 
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task context and Experiments 3, 4, and 5 revealed inconsistent results with respect to the role of 
prime duration, we conducted integrative data analyses (Curran & Hussong, 2009) using (a) the 
combined data from Experiments 1, 2, and 5, collapsing over prime duration conditions and (b) 
the combined data from Experiments 3, 4 and 5, collapsing over the task context conditions, 
excluding the valence judgment condition. Using the combined data sets, we calculated Bayes 
factors (BF; see Table 1), using JASP (2018) and the BayesFactor package (Morey & Rouder, 
2018) in the statistical software R Version 3.5.1 for Windows (R Core Team, 2018) to quantify 
the evidence for the presence or absence of effects. We adopted the convention that BF10 = 1 
implies lack of any evidence (i.e., the data are as likely to occur under H0 as under H1), 1 < BF10 
≤ 3 implies anecdotal evidence for H1, 3 < BF10 ≤ 10 implies moderate evidence for H1, 10 < 
BF10 ≤ 30 implies strong evidence for H1, 30 < BF10 ≤ 100 implies very strong evidence for H1 
and BF10 > 100 implies decisive evidence for H1 (Jeffreys, 1961; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013). 
Conversely, .30 < BF10 ≤ 1 implies anecdotal evidence for H0, .10 < BF10 ≤ .30 implies 
moderate evidence for H0, .03 < BF10 ≤ .10 implies strong evidence for H0, .01 < BF10 ≤ .03 
implies very strong evidence for H0 and BF10 < .01 implies decisive evidence for H0. 
The combined analysis of Experiments 1, 2, and 5 showed decisive evidence for a main 
effect of Prime Valence and moderate evidence for no interaction between Prime Valence and 
Task Context (see Table 1). The combined analysis of Experiments 3, 4, and 5 showed decisive 
evidence for a main effect of Prime Valence and decisive evidence for no interaction between 
Prime Valence and Prime Duration (see Table 1). Thus, the results of the combined analysis 
suggest that Prime Duration does not moderate positivity-familiarity effects and that effects can 
be found for long and short prime presentations. Moreover, moderate evidence exists that Task 
Context does not moderate positivity-familiarity effects and that effects can be found in contexts 
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that do and do not suggest a normatively accurate response to the question of whether a given 
stimulus is familiar or unfamiliar. 
General Discussion 
The aim of the current research was to identify conditions that produce reliable positivity-
familiarity effects and distinguish them from conditions under which positivity-familiarity 
effects are weaker and less reliable. Toward this end, we utilized a modified variant of the AMP 
(Payne et al., 2005) and investigated whether prime valence influences judgments of target 
familiarity under various conditions. Table 2 provides an overview of the results obtained in the 
current studies. Across the five studies, positivity-familiarity effects were obtained when 
participants had no basis to assume that they had been presented with the target stimuli earlier in 
the same study, the targets had to be judged in terms of their familiarity (rather than whether the 
targets had been presented before), and when affective primes were presented for moderate 
(75ms) to long (200ms) rather than short (20ms) durations. Effects were more fragile when 
participants judged the targets in terms of their familiarity, but had a basis to assume that the 
targets might have been presented before or when the primes were presented for short durations. 
No significant positivity-familiarity effects were obtained when participants had a basis to 
assume that they had been presented with targets earlier and had to judge whether targets had 
been presented to them before. Nevertheless, Bayes Factor analyses on the combined data from 
Experiments 1, 2, and 5 and Experiments 3, 4, and 5, respectively, suggest that positivity-
familiarity effects are relatively robust overall and not moderated by prime duration and by a 
task context that does or does not suggest a normatively accurate response to the question of 
whether a given stimulus is familiar or unfamiliar. 
The latter finding stands in contrast to speculations that the positivity-familiarity effect 
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may depend on conditions in which the task context does not suggest the existence of 
normatively accurate responses in the familiarity task (Weil et al., 2017). This speculation was 
based on the assumptions that (a) an alleged stimulus exposure task might enhance analytic 
processing, and (b) misattribution of affective responses is more pronounced under conditions of 
non-analytic processing and reduced by analytic processing (Eder & Deutsch, 2015; De Houwer 
& Smith, 2013; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2007). Although the results of the individual experiments 
(Experiments 1, 2, 5) suggest that particular contextual features might be more likely to prevent 
analytic processing (i.e., not providing participants with a basis to assume prior presentation of 
target stimuli) than others (i.e., judging targets in terms of general familiarity, rather than 
whether they had been presented before), the results of the combined Bayesian analysis suggest 
that the present manipulation of task context was not successful in clearly differentiating 
between analytical and non-analytical processing. While this interpretation seems to be in line 
with research demonstrating positivity-familiarity effects despite the existence of a normatively 
accurate response (see Monin, 2003; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2007), it reopens the question of what 
prevented the occurrence of positivity-familiarity effects under similar conditions in earlier 
studies (Weil et al., 2017). 
A further aim of the present study was to shed light on seemingly inconsistent results in the 
literature on the positivity-familiarity effect. Whereas some studies suggest that alleged 
presentations of the target stimuli in a prior task eliminate the positivity-familiarity effect (Weil 
et al., 2017), other studies found no such detrimental influences (e.g., Garcia-Marques et al., 
2004; Phaf & Rotteveel, 2005). We speculated that other determinants of misattribution effects 
might carry more weight when the task context suggests a normatively accurate response and 
identified prime salience as one such determinant. Specifically, we hypothesized that long prime 
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presentations increase the salience of the primes, which may reduce the misattribution of prime 
features to the targets (e.g., Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; White & Knight, 1984). However, counter 
to this hypothesis, Experiment 3 showed that positivity-familiarity effects occurred only for long 
(200ms) but not for short (20ms) prime presentations (for related findings, see Gellatly, Banton, 
& Woods, 1995; Newell & Shanks, 2007). Moreover, the results of the combined Bayesian 
analysis suggest that prime duration does not moderate positivity-familiarity effects at all.  
The obtained effects of prime duration may indicate that the attribution of positivity to 
familiarity may be less dependent on source confusion than suggested by extant accounts. In this 
case, positivity-familiarity effects may result from a deliberate choice to use content activated by 
one source to make judgments about another source. In line with this interpretation, some studies 
suggest that attributions of familiarity to positivity are enhanced when familiar stimuli are 
recognized (Newell & Shanks, 2007) and the attribution of affect to a neutral source seems more 
likely when affect was more intense (as compared to less intense affective stimuli; Mierop et al., 
2018). Such an explanation for the present and related findings might have further implications 
for social psychological phenomena assumed to be driven by misattribution, raising the question 
of whether at least some of these phenomena occur despite an identification of true sources. 
Future research should aim to identify the conditions under which people choose to use content 
activated by one source to make judgments about another source. 
Although the current research found relatively robust positivity-familiarity effects, it is 
worth noting that the observed effects of prime valence on judgments of target familiarity were 
relatively small with effect sizes ranging from ηp2 = .02 to ηp2 = .06. Effects of prime valence on 
judgments of target valence were considerable larger with effect sizes ranging from ηp2 = .10 to 
ηp2 = .20 (see Experiment 4). Thus, failures to replicate the positivity-familiarity effect can be 
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due to insufficient statistical power in identifying relatively small effects of prime valence on 
judgments of target familiarity (Maxwell et al., 2015). The current work anticipated potential 
concerns in this regard by using sample sizes that were considerable larger compared to the ones 
in previous studies on the positivity-familiarity effect. Yet, even large sample sizes may 
sometimes be insufficient (e.g., Weil et al., 2017). Thus, future research should further aim to 
identify conditions under which positivity-familiarity effects become fragile and conditions that 
produce reliable positivity-familiarity effects. 
As a caveat, we should note that in Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 we required that participants 
had completed at least 100 studies on Prolific Academic (Palan, & Schitter, 2018; Peer et al., 
2017). This criterion was used to ensure that the required approval record of 95% referred to a 
sensible base-rate and that the quality of obtained data would be high. However, this criterion 
includes a trade-off between naivety of participants and data quality. We did not anticipate any 
effects of familiarity with psychological experimental paradigms on the effects of interest in the 
present study. In Experiments 4 and 5, we used a more lenient eligibility criterion of having 
completed at least 10 studies on Prolific Academic. Our procedure of excluding participants who 
used the same response key on more than 90% of the AMP trials is assumed to mitigate this 
more lenient criterion. 
Future Directions 
To the extent that the positivity-familiarity effect is closely related to fluency-familiarity 
effects (e.g., Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003), well-known moderators of 
fluency-familiarity effects might also moderate positivity-familiarity effects. For example, it has 
been found that fluency effects are relative in the sense that they are sensitive to expectations of 
experienced fluency (Westerman, 2008; Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003). Moreover, fluency effects 
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are typically smaller when the source of fluency is salient (Gellatly et al., 1995). This finding 
might also inform the present findings regarding the effects of prime duration. For example, 
Gellatly et al. (1995) demonstrated that identification of a connection between prime and target, 
rather than prime duration, moderated fluency effects. Thus, with respect to the present research, 
it is possible that longer prime durations reduce positivity-familiarity effects only when 
participants are aware of the effect of prime valence on their judgments of the target. To the 
extent that participants are unaware of this influence, priming effects may increase as a function 
of affect strength, leading to stronger positivity-familiarity effects for long compared to short 
prime presentation times. Future research may help to illuminate potential parallels between 
fluency-familiarity effects and positivity-familiarity effects by investigating interactive effects of 
prime duration and awareness. 
Another factor that might influence the likelihood of misattribution is applicability of 
activated content to specific target affordances (e.g., Ecker & Bar-Anan, 2018). With respect to 
the positivity-familiarity effect, positive affect has been manipulated either contextually (e.g., 
Garcia-Marques et al., 2004; Phaf & Rotteveel, 2005) or via features of the target objects (e.g., 
Corneille et al., 2005; Monin, 2003). Thus, applicability might be high if positive affect is 
elicited by the object that has to be judged in terms of its familiarity. However, applicability 
might be low if positive affect stems from a source that is different from the target. In the latter 
case, the target may need to have features that are conceptually related to positivity, so that 
overlap between positivity and familiarity is possible. Thus, when positive affect is elicited by 
contextual stimulus, misattribution of positive affect to familiarity might be influenced by 
source-target fit. The present set of studies relied on specific prime material (i.e., IAPS; Lang, et 
al., 2008). Although it seems safe to assume that the IAPS stimuli elicited positive or negative 
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affect, we cannot rule out that different prime stimuli would influence the misattribution of 
positivity to judgments of familiarity differently. Thus, future research may provide deeper 
insights into this question by using a variety of affective prime stimuli and investigating source-
target fit as a potential moderator of positivity-familiarity effects.  
Conclusion 
The present research aimed to identify conditions that consistently produce positivity-
familiarity effects and distinguish them from conditions under which positivity-familiarity 
effects are weaker and less reliable. Overall, we found significant positivity-familiarity effects in 
seven out of twelve conditions. Nevertheless, Bayes Factor analyses on the combined data 
suggested that positivity-familiarity effects are quite robust and were not moderated by task 
context or prime duration. Thus, the present results pose a challenge for extant accounts of 
positivity-familiarity effects. To the extent that a task context that suggests a normatively 
accurate response does not enhance analytic processing, it remains an open question what 
prevented the occurrence of positivity-familiarity effects in earlier studies (Weil, et al., 2017). 
Yet, to the extent that such a task context does enhance analytic processing, it remains unclear 
why it did not moderate positivity-familiarity effects in the Bayesian Factor analysis of the 
combined data. Moreover, to the extent that longer prime presentations reduce misattribution 
effects by increasing the salience of the primes and prime duration does not moderate positivity-
familiarity effects, it might be questioned whether the underlying mechanism is indeed a 
misattribution of positivity to judgments of familiarity or whether the effect might be driven by 
other, yet to be identified processes. Taken together, the present research highlights the 
importance of investigating the assumed underlying misattribution process of positivity-
familiarity effects and to verify proposed processes by identifying their boundary conditions. 
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Open Practices 
All materials and data are available at https://osf.io/3m25w/. 
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Main Effects and Interactions Bayes Factors 
Combined analysis of Experiment 1, 2, and 5  
Prime Valence BF10 = 215617.352 
Task Context BF10 = .132 
Prime Valence × Task Context BF10 = .106 
Combined analysis of Experiment 3, 4, and 5  
Prime Valence BF10 = 5890.218 
Prime Duration BF10 = .084 
Prime Valence × Prime Duration BF10 = .0056 
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Table 2. Summary of results in Experiments 1-5. Emergence of a significant positivity-
familiarity effect as a function of bogus stimuli in prior subliminal presentation task (judgment-
relevant vs. judgment-irrelevant), target judgment (familiar/unfamiliar vs. old/new), and prime 
presentation times (20ms vs. 75ms vs. 200ms). 






familiar/unfamiliar 75ms Yes 
 judgment-
irrelevant 
familiar/unfamiliar 75ms Yes 
Exp. 2 judgment-
relevant 
familiar/unfamiliar 75ms No 
 judgment-
relevant 
old/new 75ms No 
Exp. 3 - familiar/unfamiliar 20ms No 
 - familiar/unfamiliar 200ms Yes 
Exp. 4 - familiar/unfamiliar 20ms Yes 
 - familiar/unfamiliar 200ms Yes 
Exp. 5 judgment-
relevant 
old/new 20ms No 
 judgment-
relevant 
old/new 200ms No 
 judgment-
irrelevant 
familiar/unfamiliar 20ms Yes 
 judgment-
irrelevant 













Figure 1. Mean percentages of “familiar” judgments as a function of prime valence (positive, 
neutral, negative) and bogus stimuli in the subliminal presentation task (judgment-relevant vs. 









Figure 2. Mean percentages of “familiar” judgments as a function of prime valence (positive, 
neutral, negative) and target judgment (old/new vs. familiar/unfamiliar), Experiment 2. Error 
bars depict 95% confidence intervals. 
 









Figure 3. Mean percentages of “familiar” judgments as a function of prime valence (positive, 











Figure 4. Mean percentages of “pleasant/familiar” judgments as a function of prime valence 
(positive, neutral, negative), prime duration (short vs. long), and target judgment (valence vs. 
familiarity), Experiment 4. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. 











Figure 5. Mean percentages of “familiar” judgments as a function of prime valence (positive, 
neutral, negative), prime duration (short vs. long), and task context (judgment-relevant vs. 
judgment-irrelevant), Experiment 5. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
